

The South African Banking Director Network: An Investigation Into Interlocking Directorships Using Social Network Analysis (SNA)

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ABSTRACT

The theory of complex systems has gained significant ground in recent years, and with it, complex network theory has become an essential approach to complex systems. This study follows international trends in examining the interlocking South African bank director network using social network analysis (SNA), which is shown to be a highly connected social network that has ties to many South African industries, including healthcare, mining, and education. The most highly connected directors and companies are identified, along with those that are most central to the network, and those that serve important bridging functions in facilitating network coherence. As this study is exploratory, numerous suggestions are also made for further research.

Keywords: Social Network Analysis (SNA); Complex Social Systems; Complex Networks; Bank Directors; South African Banking

INTRODUCTION

Since the mid-1990s, the theory of complex systems has gained significant ground in a variety of academic disciplines, including in economics. Most of the social environment can be described as a complex system, where millions of actors interact to produce complex emergent properties, non-linear interactions and adaptability, as Kwapień and Drożdż (2012, p. 118) define a complex system, “a complex system is a system built from a large number of nonlinearly interacting constituents, which exhibits collective behaviour and, due to an exchange of energy or information with the environment, can easily modify its internal structure and patterns of activity.” International trade is no different; indeed, Kwapień and Drożdż (2012, p. 118) specifically name financial markets as an example of a complex system.

Along with complex systems theory, the theory of complex networks has recently gained ground in a variety of disciplines, starting with the seminal studies by Watts and Strogatz (1998) and Barabási and Albert (1999) (although the theory itself can be traced back to Leonard Euler’s Königsberg bridge puzzle of 1736, see Amaral and Ottino, 2004, p. 151). Complex network theory is an approach to complex systems, and uses network theory’s ability to represent a network visually, along with network theory’s variety of mathematical formulae, to calculate the roles entities play in a network. Barabási (2009, p. 413) writes:

Today the understanding of networks is a common goal of an unprecedented array of traditional disciplines: Cell biologists use networks to make sense of signal transduction cascades and metabolism, to name a few applications in this area; computer scientists are mapping the Internet and the WWW; epidemiologists follow transmission networks through which viruses spread; and brain researchers are after the connectome, a neural-level connectivity map of the brain. Although many fads have come and gone in complexity, one thing is increasingly clear: Interconnectivity is so fundamental to the behaviour of complex systems that networks are here to stay.

Network theory has proved an important and essential approach to complex systems in fields as diverse as epidemiology, biology, security studies, and communication science (Luke & Stamatakis, 2012, p. 362). Economics has also utilised network theory: Smith and White (1992, p. 861) already wrote that Snyder and Kick (1979) and Steiber (1979) were “the first explicit attempts to use the network approach to examine the world-system.” Since these publications, global economic systems have been approached as networks in numerous studies (see Nemeth & Smith, 1985; Smith & White, 1992, p. 857; Jackson, 2007; De Benedictis & Tajoli, 2008; Flandreau & Jobst, 2005, 2009). Fricke, Finger, and Lux (2013, p. 2) write, “[I]nvestigations of complex systems in terms of their network properties gain more and more attention in economics following the lead of other disciplines in which network analyses have already a long tradition.”

A classic application of network theory in the field of economics is the study of interlocking directorships (see e.g., Heemskerk, 2013; Comet & Pizarro, 2011; Conyon & Muldoon, 2006; Robins & Alexander, 2004; Davis, Yoo, & Baker, 2003; Alexander, 2003; Mintz & Schwartz, 1985; Useem, 1984; Mizruchi, 1982; Levine, 1977). By approaching the network of directors as a social network, insight is gained into how ideas spread within an economy. As Davis, Yoo, and Baker (2003, p. 305) write:

...while the origins of ties among firms and directors may be primarily social rather than strategic, dozens of studies since the late 1980s have documented the influence of shared directorships on choices about corporate strategy and structure, from the ideological tone of political activism to basic choices about organization design.

At the heart of a country’s financial industry lies the banking industry; Davis, Yoo, and Baker (2003, p. 302) call commercial banks “the traditional centre of the interlock network” (although in the US economy, banks lost their position of centrality by the mid-1990s, Davis, Yoo, and Baker, 2003, p. 309). Banks often recruit well-connected CEOs (Davis, Yoo, & Baker, 2003, p. 303), which allows them to monitor important economic sectors closely, and it therefore comes as no surprise that the banking industry in particular has been studied as a network (Davis & Mizruchi, 1999). Approaching the banking industry as a network therefore provides a view of the financial core of a country’s economy in terms of interlocking directorships, and those companies that share this core can be seen as belonging to key industries in an economy.

The current study examines the current interlocking directorships associated with the banking industry in South Africa (as of 1 October 2013). Using the list of South African banks provided in the South African Reserve Bank’s Department of Banking Supervision (2012), data on currently serving company directors was gathered using the detailed company overviews provided through Bloomberg’s BusinessWeek (<http://www.businessweek.com/>), and it was recorded which directors are affiliated with which other directors, apart from those in their own company. Because a director does not necessarily serve on the boards of all subsidiary companies of a parent company, the boards of directors of subsidiary companies was also distinguished. The companies involved were also recorded, meaning that person A is a director of bank B, but also sits on the board of company C with directors D, E, and F, who in turn also serve on the boards of companies G, H, and I. The resulting network is what Watts (2004, p. 248) calls a bipartite network, which consists of two types of entities: people and companies (see also Koskinen & Edling 2012, p. 309; Conyon & Muldoon, 2006, p. 1326). In total, this network consists of 3,204 entities (people and companies) and 10,157 relationships, and these relationships were plotted using Sentinel Visualizer, a specialised Social Network Analysis program developed for the US intelligence community. Although the data is surely not complete, it is a comprehensive database of interlocking directorships centred on the South African banking industry. In this article, the emphasis falls on what Kwapień and Drożdż (2012, p. 210) call “Microscopic topological properties of a network,” namely node degrees, betweenness, and the existence of particular edges, rather than on macroscopic network properties such as average path length, scale-free link distributions and the like, because macroscopic network properties have already been thoroughly documented in the study of company director networks (see e.g., Nicholson, Alexander, & Kiel, 2004; Conyon & Muldoon, 2006).

OVERVIEW OF NETWORK THEORY

Because network theory is an unfamiliar theoretical approach in South Africa, the following section provides an overview of the major principles involved.

Virtually any system can be studied as a network, which consists of entities (also called *actors*, *nodes*, or *vertices*), and their relationships (also called *ties*, *links*, or *edges*) (Brandes, Freeman, & Wagner, 2013, p. 805; Onel, Zeid, & Kamarthi, 2011, p. 120; Newman, 2001, p. 404; Newman, 2003, p. 168; Dos Santos et al., 2012, p. 240). The interdisciplinary roots of network theory, which are found mainly in mathematical graph theory, sociology, and anthropology, result in a multitude of terms associated with the same phenomena, but the core of the theory remains the same regardless of the application: the total network is capable of a greater functionality than the sum of individual parts (emergence). In network theory, the emphasis falls on the relationships between entities rather than on entities' individual characteristics (Serrat, 2010, p. 2).

Numerous studies – particularly by the physics community – have found further universal properties of complex networks. Newman (2003) distinguishes between four types of complex networks: biological networks, technological networks, information networks, and social networks. Biological networks include ecosystems, protein networks, neurological networks, metabolic processes, and food webs, while technological networks include the Internet, transport networks, and power grids. Information networks include the World Wide Web and citation networks in academic fields, while social networks include everything from film actor networks, terrorist networks, and family and friendship networks, to interlocking director networks of international companies and organisations. All of these exhibit similar characteristics, including amongst others small-worldedness, the existence of highly connected entities, scale-free link distributions, robustness, clustering, and assortativity (Amaral & Ottino, 2004, p. 151; Buchanan, 2003, p. 15), as Barabási (2009, p. 412) writes:

... probably the most surprising discovery of modern network theory is the universality of the network topology: Many real networks, from the cell to the Internet, independent of their age, function, and scope, converge to similar architectures. It is this universality that allowed researchers from different disciplines to embrace network theory as a common paradigm.

Small-worldedness refers to the phenomenon that, on average, every entity in a network is connected to every other entity via a relatively short path, as noted by Watts and Strogatz (1998). Strogatz (2004[2003], p. 232) writes, “the ‘small-world’ phenomenon is much more than a curiosity of human social life: It’s a unifying feature of diverse networks found in nature and technology” (see also Watts 2004[2003], p. 100). In terms of company directors, the research done by Conyon and Muldoon (2006, p. 1337) on directorships in the US, UK, and Germany, as well as by Nicholson, Alexander, and Kiel (2004) on directorships in the US and Australia, support Watts and Strogatz’s prediction that small-worldedness is a near-universal characteristic of complex networks: both found short average path lengths between entities in company director networks.

Scale-free (power law) link distributions were first identified by Barabási and Albert (1999), and denotes that there are few highly connected entities in a network, while the majority of entities are poorly connected (Watts, 2004, p. 248; Buchanan, 2003, pp. 84-85). Scale-free link distributions are similar to Pareto’s Law – the familiar 80/20 division of wealth in society, where the majority of the population each hold little of a country’s total wealth, while the majority of a country’s wealth can be found in the hands of a select few. In terms of network topology, the power law predicts that link distributions will be similarly scaled, with the vast majority of entities having few ties in the network, while a few entities will be extremely well connected. This trend has also been compared with the highly similar Matthew Effect, Zipf’s Law, and Lotka’s Law of scientific productivity (Newman, 2005, p. 340), and has been found in diverse networks; as Kwapien and Drożdż (2012, p. 207) write, the phenomenon has been observed in “actor co-appearances in movies, scientific paper citations, Internet physical structure, air traffic and airport networks, Internet social networks, sexual contact networks, epidemic networks, metabolic networks, gene-coexpression networks, and many other systems” (see also Newman, 2005, p. 325, Barabási, 2009, p. 412; Buchanan, 2003, p. 83; Clauset, Shalizi, & Newman, 2009). As can be expected, the same link distribution can be observed in interlocking directorship networks, as Conyon and Muldoon (2006, p. 1335) write:

The average size of a US board is about 10 members and each director, on average, has 1.63 directorships (including the directorship at his or her main company). An individual occupying only one board position is a one-board director. Analogously, a person with two directorships is a two-board director. In the US, the overwhelming majority of directors (about 80%) have only one directorship. About 13% hold precisely two positions, implying that a very small fraction of directors (7%) hold more than two director posts.

This characteristic of complex networks results in network robustness: when the majority of entities are not well connected, complex networks were found to be highly robust against random failures, because it is unlikely that the few well connected entities will fail when surrounded by a large number of less well connected entities. However, complex networks were found to be highly susceptible to cascading failures when these highly connected entities are removed from the network (Buchanan, 2003, p. 131). The scale-free link distribution is thus a proverbial double-edged sword in terms of network robustness: complex networks are robust, but only against random failure (Watts, 2004[2003], pp. 191-2; Haldane, 2009, p. 11). Kwapien and Drozd (2012, p. 126) refer to this characteristic of complex systems as Highly Optimized Tolerance (HOT), where “A complex system, as understood by HOT, is very flexible to both the internal perturbations and errors and the unfavourable external factors.” Simultaneously, “highly optimized, tolerant systems are significantly vulnerable to very rare, unusual events (e.g., cascading failures).”

Another topological feature of complex networks is clustering, which refers to the tendency of entities to form clusters or subgroups, where entities within the cluster are more highly connected than they are with entities outside the cluster (Zhu, Watts, & Chen, 2010, p. 152). In terms of network structure, clustering often leads to the formation of triangles, where; e.g., entities B and C, who are connected to entity A, are also connected to each other. More formally, clustering can be defined as “the propensity for vertex pairs (e.g., boards) to be connected if they share a mutual neighbour” (Conyon & Muldoon, 2006, p. 1322, see also Newman, 2003, p. 183).

Assortativity refers to the tendency of similar entities to form connections. In terms of social networks, it has been found in numerous studies that people tend to associate according to race, income level, and/or age (Newman, 2003, p. 191). A specific form of assortativity is degree correlation, where the best-connected entities tend to form ties to other highly connected entities (Watts, 2004, pp. 258-259). This is one of few areas where social networks differ from other types of networks: while social networks are assortative, other types of networks were found to be disassortative (Newman, 2003, p. 193). Again, assortativity was found in director networks: Conyon and Muldoon (2006, p. 1342) for instance found a positive degree correlation between directors, and write, “[D]irectors who sit on many boards appear to do so in the company of others who also sit on many boards.”

While it is not the objective of this article to test the South African banking industry director network against the above topological features of complex networks, note that clusters and highly-connected entities (forming star structures) can be identified visually through a graph:




Figure 1: The Total Network of Directors in the South African Banking Industry

Here it can be seen that although the industry is highly connected, two clusters are unconnected to the rest of the network (at the top right of the graph). These are Habas Investments (1960) Ltd. and Albaraka Turk Katilim Bankas, who are also not connected to each other. The implication is that these two banks are not connected to the South African economy via the director network, and their separation influences an analysis of the network directly, as the following discussion shows.

CENTRALITY MEASURES

While the previous section discussed some macro level characteristics of complex networks with specific reference to interlocking director networks, at the micro level, entities' roles can be studied with a variety of measures. In order to calculate the roles entities play in a network, the most widely used centrality measures are those developed by Freeman (1979), namely degree centrality, closeness centrality, and betweenness centrality, as discussed in the following paragraphs. However, because closeness centrality cannot be calculated when parts of a network are unconnected, as is the case here since two banks are not connected to the rest of the industry, these two banks were removed from the network to facilitate the following discussion.

Degree centrality calculates the number of ties an entity has with its direct neighbours (Donges et al., 2009, p. 158; Barnes & Ritter, 2001, p. 207), and a high degree centrality simply means that such an entity has more direct ties to his neighbours than other entities. Degree centrality is a measure of activity (Freeman, 1979, p. 238); in the banking director network, the people with the highest degree centralities are those with the most connections to other entities, both to people and companies. The formula for calculating degree centrality for node i is the following (Prell, 2012, p. 97):

$$C_D(i) = \sum_{j=1}^n x_{ij} = \sum_{i=1}^n x_{ij}$$

Where,

x_{ij} = the value of the tie from actor i to actor j (the value being either 0 or 1), and thus it is the sum of all ties
 n = the number of nodes in the network

Note however that, in contrast to the assertion by Mahdi et al. (2012, p. 278), degree centrality is not necessarily a measure of influence, because it is also important to note *where* an entity's connections lead (Prell, 2012, p. 97). An entity could have a large number of connections to lower-level entities, which are less important in terms of the overall structure of the network than connections to entities with a high betweenness centrality.

Betweenness centrality measures to what extent an entity lies on the shortest path between other entities in a network, and often whether an entity lies on the *only* path between other entities. An entity with a high betweenness centrality is therefore in a favourable position to control the flow of information in a network. As Freeman (1979, p. 221) originally noted, betweenness centrality identifies "a point that falls on the communication paths between other points [which] exhibits a potential for control of their communication." Furthermore, entities with a high betweenness centrality contribute to network coherence; without them, a network easily disintegrates into unconnected clusters (Dos Santos et al., 2012, p. 240; Hafner Burton, Kahler, & Montgomery, 2009, p. 564), and therefore entities with a high betweenness centrality contribute most to facilitating the flow of information in a network. Betweenness centrality is calculated with the following formula (Prell, 2012, p. 105):

$$C_B(k) = \sum \hat{c}_{ikj} / \hat{c}_{ij}, i \neq j \neq k$$

\hat{c}_{ikj} = the number of geodesics linking actors i and j that pass through node k ;

\hat{c}_{ij} = the number of geodesics linking nodes i and j , and thus the betweenness calculation is for node k .

In terms of the interlocking director network, Davis, Yoo, and Baker (2003, p. 319) refer to "linchpin directors" who serve as bridges between companies, and use the betweenness centrality measure to identify these linchpins.

Closeness centrality refers to how close an entity is, in terms of connections, to all other entities in a network. Entities with a high closeness centrality have a short path to most other entities in a network (Butts, 2008, p. 23), and are therefore central role players. Closeness centrality is calculated with the following formula (Prell, 2012, p. 108):

$$C_C(i) = \sum d_{ij} \text{ where } d_{ij} = \text{the distance connecting actor } i \text{ to actor } j.$$

The following table gives the degree-, betweenness-, and closeness centrality scores of the highest-scoring 40 company directors in this network:

Table 1: The Degree, Betweenness, and Closeness Centrality Scores of the Highest-Scoring 40 Company Directors

Entity Name	Degree	Entity Name	Betweenness	Entity Name	Closeness
1. Jan Jonathan Durand	151	Steven B. Epstein	1.0000	Nigel George Payne	1.0000
2. Cheryl Ann Carolus	141	Jan Jonathan Durand	0.8469	Benedict James van der Ross	0.9861
3. Steven B. Epstein	130	Cheryl Ann Carolus	0.8265	Jan Jonathan Durand	0.9851
4. Stephen Koseff	126	Nomavuso Patience Mnxasana	0.8201	Paul Cambo Baloyi	0.9847
5. Nomavuso Patience Mnxasana	120	Fani Titi	0.8189	Stephen Koseff	0.9782
6. Benedict James van der Ross	116	Stephen Koseff	0.7227	Douglas Denoon Balharrie Band	0.9762
7. Myles J. D. Ruck	99	Benedict James van der Ross	0.7065	Fani Titi	0.9611
8. Hugh Sidney Herman	95	Douglas Denoon Balharrie Band	0.6071	Myles J. D. Ruck	0.9521
9. Nigel George Payne	95	Grant Glenn Gelink	0.5736	Wendy Elizabeth Lucas-Bull	0.9492
10. Fani Titi	93	Nigel George Payne	0.5724	Nomavuso Patience Mnxasana	0.9484
11. Grant Glenn Gelink	92	Myles J. D. Ruck	0.5165	William Rodger Jardine	0.9360
12. Peter Mangalani Malungani	91	William Rodger Jardine	0.4935	Grant Glenn Gelink	0.9293
13. William Rodger Jardine	91	Sandile D. M. Zungu	0.4739	Koosum Parsotam Kalyan	0.9277
14. Bernard Kantor	90	Koosum Parsotam Kalyan	0.4662	Cheryl Ann Carolus	0.9269
15. Sandile D. M. Zungu	88	Robert Haldane Smith	0.4476	Nolulamo Nobambiswano Gwagwa	0.9179
16. Kgomotso Ditsebe Moroka	85	Paul Cambo Baloyi	0.4021	Hugh Sidney Herman	0.9160
17. Haruko Fukuda	84	Wendy Elizabeth Lucas-Bull	0.3746	Dhanasagree Naidoo	0.9113
18. Leon Crouse	84	Hugh Sidney Herman	0.3674	Thoko Martha Mokgosi-Mwantembe	0.9056
19. Mary Sina Bomela	82	Gloria Tomatoe Serobe	0.3276	Peter Mangalani Malungani	0.9021
20. Paul Cambo Baloyi	82	Kgomotso Ditsebe Moroka	0.3186	Gloria Tomatoe Serobe	0.9003
21. Robert Haldane Smith	81	Mary Sina Bomela	0.3011	Sandile D. M. Zungu	0.8981
22. Yolanda Zoleka Cuba	81	Thoko Martha Mokgosi-Mwantembe	0.2990	Leon Crouse	0.8981
23. Douglas Denoon Balharrie Band	78	Dhanasagree Naidoo	0.2915	Peter Bambatha Matlare	0.8966
24. Gloria Tomatoe Serobe	78	Yolanda Zoleka Cuba	0.2900	Paul Kenneth Harris	0.8943
25. Hendrik Jacobus du Toit	78	Trevor Stewart Munday	0.2683	Steven B. Epstein	0.8869
26. Nolulamo Nobambiswano Gwagwa	78	Louis Leon Von Zeuner	0.2535	Bernard Kantor	0.8820
27. Peregrine Kenneth Oughton Crosthwaite	78	Peter Bambatha Matlare	0.2518	Amanda Tandiwe Nzimande	0.8772

Table 1 cont.

28. Peter Richard Suter Thomas	78	Nolulamo Nobambiswano Gwagwa	0.2361	Trevor Stewart Munday	0.8757
29. Trevor Stewart Munday	78	Peter Mangalani Malungani	0.2323	Bradley Fried	0.8714
30. Wendy Elizabeth Lucas-Bull	78	Haruko Fukuda	0.2219	Louis Leon Von Zeuner	0.8695
31. Bradley Fried	77	Bradley Fried	0.1956	Haruko Fukuda	0.8666
32. Koosum Parsotam Kalyan	76	Peregrine Kenneth Oughton Crosthwaite	0.1645	Glynn R. Burger	0.8662
33. Thoko Martha Mokgosi-Mwantembe	75	Leon Crouse	0.1448	Robert Haldane Smith	0.8660
34. Amanda Tandiwe Nzimande	73	Hendrik Jacobus du Toit	0.1412	Peregrine Kenneth Oughton Crosthwaite	0.8657
35. Dhanasagree Naidoo	73	Amanda Tandiwe Nzimande	0.1186	Hendrik Jacobus du Toit	0.8657
36. Louis Leon Von Zeuner	73	Bernard Kantor	0.0901	Mary Sina Bomela	0.8656
37. Paul Kenneth Harris	73	Peter Richard Suter Thomas	0.0695	Peter Richard Suter Thomas	0.8656
38. Peter Bambatha Matlare	73	Lauritz Lanser Dippenaar	0.0577	Kgomotso Ditsebe Moroka	0.8645
39. Glynn R. Burger	72	Paul Kenneth Harris	0.0553	Yolanda Zoleka Cuba	0.8645
40. Lauritz Lanser Dippenaar	69	Glynn R. Burger	0.0281	Lauritz Lanser Dippenaar	0.8636

This means that Jan Jonathan Durand has the highest number of direct connections in this network, Cheryl Ann Carolus the second highest number, etcetera. Note that degree centrality in this instance refers to directors’ connections to both other directors and companies. As discussed previously, degree centrality is a measure of activity, and thus these are the directors that are most active in the South African bank industry in terms of the interlocking director network. Jan Jonathan Durand is for instance linked directly to a large number of directors, to a total of 145 connections to directors (his remaining six connections are to companies).

The betweenness centrality scores indicate to what extent entities serve as linchpins by connecting companies, providing coherence to the industry. Again, Durand scores high, along with Steven B. Epstein, Cheryl Ann Carolus, and Nomavuso Patience Mnxasana.

The interlocking director network of course serves to link companies together, providing the opportunity for the banking industry to monitor various sectors of the economy to mitigate lending risks. The following table provides the degree-, betweenness-, and closeness centralities of the 40 highest-scoring companies in this network:

Table 2: The Degree, Betweenness, and Closeness Centralities of the 40 Highest-Scoring Companies

Entity	Degree	Entity	Betweenness	Entity	Closeness
1. Investec Limited	45	Tiger Brands Limited	0.0774	Bidvest Group Ltd	0.9319
2. International Crisis Group (The)	43	Deenadayalen Konar	0.0637	MTN Group Limited	0.8800
3. Investec plc	36	CIDA Empowerment Fund	0.0455	Investec Limited	0.8633
4. Standard International Holdings SA	34	Santam Ltd.	0.0446	Investec plc	0.8624
5. Standard Chartered PLC	32	Barclays Africa Group Limited	0.0425	FirstRand Limited	0.8584
6. Investec Bank Plc	29	MTN Group Limited	0.0302	Standard Bank Group Limited	0.8479
7. FirstRand Limited	28	Steinhoff International Holdings Ltd.	0.0208	Anglo American Platinum Limited	0.8447
8. Radius Ventures, LLC	27	Bidvest Group Ltd	0.0203	The Standard Bank of South Africa Limited	0.8369

Table 2 cont.

9. Standard Bank Group Limited	27	Kagiso Tiso Holdings Proprietary Limited	0.0198	JSE Limited	0.8355
10. Bidvest Group Ltd	23	FirstRand Limited	0.0194	Investec Bank Plc	0.8354
11. Steinhoff International Holdings Ltd.	23	Pan-African Capital Holdings (PTY) Ltd.	0.0173	Barclays Africa Group Limited	0.8349
12. Tiger Brands Limited	23	Nedbank, Ltd.	0.0161	Deenadayalen Konar	0.8311
13. Compagnie Financiere Richemont SA	21	Transnet SOC Limited	0.0157	Mr Price Group Limited	0.8268
14. Aveng Limited	20	Compagnie Financiere Richemont SA	0.0153	Remgro Limited	0.8253
15. DigiCore Holdings Limited	20	ConvergeNet Holdings Limited	0.0144	Pick n Pay Stores Ltd.	0.8241
16. Investec Bank Limited	20	Aveng Limited	0.0132	Aveng Limited	0.8220
17. MMI Holdings Limited	20	Woolworths Holdings Limited	0.0129	FirstRand Bank Limited	0.8214
18. Nedbank, Ltd.	20	Vantage Capital Group	0.0127	Discovery Limited	0.8207
19. Anglo American Platinum Limited	19	Incwala Resources (Pty) Ltd.	0.0121	Development Bank of Southern Africa, The	0.8205
20. Barclays Africa Group Limited	19	Alexander Forbes Equity Holdings (Proprietary) Limited	0.0120	Naspers Ltd.	0.8155
21. Discovery Limited	19	Imperial Holdings Limited	0.0115	Telkom SA SOC Limited	0.8153
22. FirstRand Bank Limited	19	Ambit Properties	0.0115	Angus W. B. Band	0.8132
23. Grindrod Limited	19	The World Bank Group	0.0113	Investec Bank Limited	0.8125
24. Old Mutual Life Assurance Company (South Africa)	19	DigiCore Holdings Limited	0.0105	Tiger Brands Limited	0.8124
25. Telkom SA SOC Limited	19	Eqstra Holdings Limited	0.0105	MMI Holdings Limited	0.8105
26. African Rainbow Minerals Limited	18	Tongaat Hulett Limited	0.0105	Metropolitan Life Limited	0.8082
27. CIDA Empowerment Fund	18	Annuity Properties Limited	0.0105	Grindrod Limited	0.8078
28. Absa Bank Limited	17	Liberty Holdings Ltd.	0.0099	Kumba Iron Ore Ltd.	0.8064
29. ABSA GROUP LTD	17	Anglo American Platinum Limited	0.0098	Absa Bank Limited	0.8058
30. African Rainbow Minerals Gold Ltd.	17	Telkom SA SOC Limited	0.0098	ABSA GROUP LTD	0.8057
31. MTN Group Limited	17	Investec plc	0.0097	Fedsure Holdings Ltd.	0.8045
32. Naspers Ltd.	17	Distell Group Limited	0.0093	Old Mutual Life Assurance Company (South Africa)	0.8027
33. Nedbank Group Limited	17	African Rainbow Minerals Limited	0.0091	Woolworths Holdings Limited	0.7949
34. Old Mutual plc	17	Sun International Ltd.	0.0087	PPC Limited	0.7930
35. Alexander Forbes Equity Holdings (Proprietary) Limited	16	Fedsure Holdings Ltd.	0.0085	Hudaco Industries Limited	0.7929
36. Development Bank of Southern Africa, The	16	Curro Holdings Limited	0.0083	Oceana Group Ltd.	0.7923
37. FirstRand EMA Holdings Limited	16	Old Mutual plc	0.0081	Nedbank, Ltd.	0.7896
38. Imperial Holdings Limited	16	Pioneer Food Group Ltd.	0.0070	Pick n Pay Holdings Limited	0.7879
39. Kagiso Tiso Holdings Proprietary Limited	16	Angus W. B. Band	0.0070	BSi Steel Limited	0.7857
40. The Standard Bank of South Africa Limited	16	Nimble Group (Proprietary) Limited	0.0068	Nedbank Group Limited	0.7849

Again, a high degree centrality means that these companies have the highest number of direct connections to directors, while a high betweenness centrality means that these companies function as linchpins in connecting the

network around the banking industry, and closeness centrality indicates that these companies are relatively closely connected to the rest of the network. Note the companies with high betweenness centrality scores: some are in the mining industry (e.g., African Rainbow Minerals Limited and Anglo American Platinum Limited), others in the food industry (e.g., Pioneer Food Group Ltd., Woolworths Holdings Limited, and Tongaat Hulett Limited), and even the paper and tourism industries are represented (e.g., Sappi Limited and Sun International Ltd.).

All of the major South African banks, ABSA, Standard Bank, Nedbank, and FirstRand, are connected to each other, as the following graph shows:



Figure 2: The Connections Between the Four Major South African Banks

In this graph, it can be seen that although clusters form around individual banks (e.g., around Standard Bank on the right), numerous close connections exist between banks. In general, Nedbank (at the bottom) is more closely associated with Absa (left) and Standard Bank (right) than with FirstRand (at the top). In addition, other South African banks are also found on this graph, meaning that they also have close ties with the major banks: Bidvest can be seen in the middle, with close ties to particularly Absa, while Grindrod can be found at the top, with close ties to FirstRand.

The above table also shows that the South African banking industry is linked to a variety of companies in the South African economy. One such industry is private healthcare. In the following graph, the second degree connections of Mediclinic International Limited, Discovery Limited, and Life Healthcare Group Holdings Limited are represented, where it can be seen that these three companies are closely connected:




Figure 3: The Second Degree Connections of Mediclinic International Limited, Discovery Limited and Life Healthcare Group Holdings Limited

These three companies are of course differently affiliated. Discovery is connected to the Bidvest Group Limited, Grindrod Limited, and FirstRand Limited, while Life Healthcare Group Holdings Limited is connected to ABSA Group Limited and Nedbank Group Limited, and Mediclinic International Limited is not closely affiliated to any South African bank.

The banking industry is of course also affiliated with the mining industry: Palabora Mining Company Limited, Harmony Gold Mining Company Limited, Endeavour Mining Corporation, Mmakau Mining (Pty) Ltd., TEAL Exploration & Mining Incorporated, Sentula Mining Limited, BlackRock World Mining Trust plc, and Mvuzo Mining Ltd. are all part of this dataset (remember that the network uses data on the banking industry, not the mining industry). However, a second degree exploration of these companies' connections reveals that none of these companies are as closely affiliated with the banking industry as the healthcare industry is, and it is only when third degree connections (indicated in Table 3) are explored that connections to banks are found.

Table 3: The Third Degree Bank Affiliations of the Mining Companies¹

Company	South African Bank
Palabora Mining Company Limited	Nedbank Group Limited, ABSA Group, Standard Bank Group Limited
Harmony Gold Mining Company Limited	Nedbank Group Limited, ABSA Group, Standard Bank Group Limited, Bidvest Group
Endeavour Mining Corporation	ABSA Group
Mmakau Mining (Pty) Ltd.	Capitec Bank
Sentula Mining Limited	Grindrod Limited, FirstRand Limited,
TEAL Exploration & Mining Incorporated	Grindrod Limited, Standard Bank Group Limited
BlackRock World Mining Trust plc	Investec Limited
Mvuzo Mining Ltd	Nedbank Group Limited

More specifically, four companies are present in the dataset that specialise in platinum: Northam Platinum Ltd, Anglo American Platinum Limited, Impala Platinum Holdings Ltd., and Royal Bafokeng Platinum Limited. Apart from Anglo American Platinum Limited, which is linked to the banking industry in two degrees, these companies are also not affiliated with the banking industry in two degrees, but in three degrees, they are affiliated in the following way:

Table 4: The Third Degree Bank Affiliations of Platinum Mining Companies

Company	South African Bank
Northam Platinum Ltd	ABSA Group
Anglo American Platinum Limited	ABSA Group, Mercantile Bank Limited, Standard Bank Group Limited
Impala Platinum Holdings Ltd.	ABSA Group, Standard Bank Group Limited, Nedbank Group Limited
Royal Bafokeng Platinum Limited	ABSA Group, Standard Bank Group Limited

What can be extrapolated from the above is that although the mining industry is not as closely affiliated with the banking industry as the healthcare industry, some banks – in particular ABSA and Standard Bank – are relatively closely connected to the mining industry in South Africa. This distance between the banking industry and the mining industry, in contrast with the health care industry, warrants further exploration in another study.

The same occurs when the second degree connections of various oil companies are explored. While Aker Oilfield Services AS, Falcon Oil & Gas Ltd., Oil and Natural Gas Cor Ltd., Forest Oil Corporation, Oil Refineries Ltd., Petroleum, Oil and Gas Corporation of South Africa (SOC) Ltd., Shell Oil Products Company LLC, and Sasol Ltd. are all part of the dataset, none of these companies have close affiliations (second degree connections) with the South African banking industry. Within three degrees, these companies are connected to the following South African banks:

¹ Of course there are many more mining companies; these are simply provided as an example.

Table 5: The Third Degree Bank Affiliations of Oil Companies

Company	South African Bank
Aker Oilfield Services	Standard Bank Group Limited
Falcon Oil & Gas Ltd.	Bidvest Group Limited
Oil and Natural Gas CorLtd.	Standard Bank Group Limited
Forest Oil Corporation	Bidvest Group Limited
Oil Refineries Ltd.	Habas Investments (1960) Ltd.
Petroleum, Oil and Gas Corporation of South Africa (SOC) Ltd.	Ubank Limited and Grindrod Limited
Shell Oil Products Company LLC	Standard Bank Group Limited
Sasol Ltd.	ABSA Group Limited, Sasfin Holdings Limited, Bidvest Group Limited, Standard Bank Group Limited

The most striking feature in the above table is that Sasol has more connections with the South African banking industry than any other company, although Sasol's long standing in the South African economy would predict that it would be the best-connected company of the above oil companies. What is surprising, however, is that Standard Bank and Bidvest dominate this industry – a feature of the South African economy that could be explored in future studies.

The only tertiary education institutions that are connected to the banking industry are the Universities of Rhodes, South Africa, Kwazulu Natal, Witwatersrand, and Cape Town. Of these universities, only one university has more than one connection: The University of Cape Town, which is linked through three directors (Paul M. G. Truyens, Mncedisi Mayekiso, and Anthony H. Miller). When second degree connections of universities are however considered, meaning not only to which directors they are linked but also to which other companies these directors are linked, Cape Town and Kwazulu Natal are linked, while Rhodes and the Witwatersrand are also connected:




Figure 4: The Second Degree Connections of Universities

Like the mining industry, tertiary institutions are therefore not closely affiliated with the banking industry, but a more interesting question to ask would be why traditionally English universities are connected to the banking industry, and not traditionally Afrikaans universities (e.g., the University of Pretoria, Stellenbosch, North-West, or the Free State).

THE CORE/PERIPHERY STRUCTURE IN THE SOUTH AFRICAN BANKING DIRECTOR NETWORK

The distinction between core and periphery is an important concept in the application of network theory to international trade. A position at the core of the network indicates that such an entity is well connected and occupies a central role in the network, while those entities positioned at the periphery play a lesser role in their industry and are also less connected. To position entities within the network, force-directed algorithms are employed, which see entities within a network as similar to physical entities, with their connections acting in a similar way to physical forces of attraction and repulsion (Merico, Gfeller, & Bader, 2009, p. 922; Fruchterman & Reingold, 1991 ;Suderman & Hallett, 2007, p. 2654). Kwapien and Drozd (2012, p. 208) for instance provide the following graph constructed for the stock exchange of 1000 American companies traded on NYSE or NASDAQ:




Figure 5: A Network of American Companies Traded on NYSE and NASDAQ

Here it can be seen how some companies concentrate connections around them and are subsequently positioned at the core, while less well-connected companies are positioned at the periphery. The companies at the very periphery of the network for instance only have one connection, and notably, that one connection is also to a company that has few other structurally important connections. In contrast, entities at the core are linked to other well-connected entities through a multitude of ties – a visual manifestation of degree correlation as mentioned above.

In the banking director network under consideration here, a similar core/periphery structure can be observed. Of course, both Habas Investments (1960) Ltd. and Albaraka Turk Katilim Bankas are generally peripheral, as they do not have ties (in terms of directors) to the rest of the network. Since the network under consideration here is concerned with South African banks, all the other South African banks are found in the core of this network. The other companies that share the core, however, are more interesting: these are the companies that are positioned closest to the South African banking industry. The following graph shows where 20 of these companies can be found (in no particular order):

Table 6: Other Companies That Share the Core Company

1.	Sun International Limited
2.	Illovo Sugar Limited
3.	Mr Price Limited
4.	Anglo American PLC
5.	BSi Steel Limited
6.	Woolworths Holdings Limited
7.	Life Healthcare Group Holdings Limited
8.	Naspers Limited
9.	Sasol Limited
10.	Vodafone Group Public Limited Company
11.	PAREXEL International
12.	Pick ‘n Pay
13.	Lewis Group
14.	Spar Group Limited
15.	Clicks Group Limited
16.	De Beers Consolidated Mines Limited
17.	Tiger Oats Limited
18.	Cashbuild
19.	Harmony Gold Mining Company Limited
20.	Nampak Limited




Figure 6: Central Companies in the Bank Industry Director Network

Here it can be seen how the force-directed algorithms has positioned the above companies – all at the core of the South African banking director network. Future studies could explore these companies' connections in more detail: which connections contributed to these companies' positions? Are there specific sectors of the South African economy that are particularly well represented at the core? Which companies (and by implication, financial sectors) are on the periphery, and why?

CONCLUSION

This article has shown how densely connected the banking industry director network is in South Africa. More specifically, it was shown which directors and companies have the highest degree-, betweenness-, and closeness centrality scores, meaning which companies and directors are the most active, play the role of linchpins most often, and are closest to the rest of the network specifically. Because this was an exploratory study using a method that is unfamiliar in South Africa, the article also generated many questions: Why is the healthcare industry more closely connected to the banking industry than the mining industry? Which other financial sectors and companies are at the core of this network, which ones are at the periphery, and why? In addition, this study provided only a single glimpse of a dynamically evolving network: How did it change over time? How did it change since 1994?

Most importantly, this article has shown that the theory of complex networks has a lot to offer South African economics, as it has in other parts of the world, and in other disciplines as well. A more detailed effort is needed to map the South African economy – in terms of director networks but also trade networks in general – in order to come to a better understanding of how the South African economy functions as a complex system.

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