

The Effect Of Auditor Change On Initial Audit Fee Discount And Non-Audit Services

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ABSTRACT

The purpose of this research is to verify whether non-audit services are provided without additional fees at the initial audit as a strategy to win an external audit contract, which could give the appearance of initial audit fee discount. From the results, non-audit services are provided at the initial audit, and the initial audit fee is discounted accordingly, only when the independent auditor is changed from a Big 4 accounting firm to a non-Big 4 accounting firm. However, there is no meaningful relevance in any other types of changes. Therefore, if the auditor is changed from a Big 4 accounting firm to a non-Big 4 accounting firm, non-audit services are provided without additional fees in order to win an external audit contract, and the publication of audit fees with a division between the audit service fee and the non-audit service fee may give the appearance of a discounted audit service fee.

Keywords: Initial Audit; Audit Fee Discount; Non-Audit Services; Auditor Change

INTRODUCTION

*A*n independent auditor generally provides audit service and non-audit services simultaneously if the audit is continuously maintained. For an independent auditor, maintaining a close and long-term relationship with an auditee is essential in providing a profitable non-audit service. This tendency is empirically verified by Beck et al. (1988a), who showed that a company purchasing repetitive non-audit services such as taxation, pension or information system from an independent auditor has a longer audit service period by the same auditor.

However, more auditors provide an audit service and non-audit services simultaneously after being appointed as an independent auditor, even though it is initial audit. Although not considered a general matter, certain exceptional factors may apply. In this research, we focus on the provision of non-audit services without additional fees by an accounting firm in order to win an external audit contract. Therefore, a new auditor is more likely to receive a level of total fees similar to those paid to the predecessor, while also providing additional non-audit services which were not provided by the predecessor. Moreover, although additional fees are not charged for these non-audit services provided, the officially reported audit fees are lower than those of the previous auditor because of the published division of audit fees and non-audit fees, which can be misrepresented as an initial audit fee discount.

The purpose of this research is to verify whether accounting firms provide non-audit services without additional fees at the initial audit as a strategy to win an audit contract, which could give the appearance of a discounted initial audit fee. According to previous research, this tendency is expected to occur when the independent auditor is changed to a small auditor. Therefore, whether the relevance between an audit fee discount at the initial audit and the provision of non-audit services is dependent on the type of auditor change is verified through an empirical analysis.

LITERATURE REVIEW AND HYPOTHESES

Literature Review

DeAngelo (1981) suggested the theoretical possibility of an initial audit fee discount based on the start-up cost of the initial audit and the transactional costs of an auditor change. This indicates that the start-up cost of a new auditor and the auditor conversion cost of the auditee, which are generated at auditor change, allow the current auditor to use quasi-rents, and that the auditor trying to acquire a new contract may suggest an initial audit fee discount based on predictable future quasi-rents. Many previous studies suggested such an initial audit fee discount phenomenon (Francis and Simon 1987; Simon and Francis 1988; Walker and Casterella 2000; Ghosh and Lustgarten 2006; Desir et al. 2014).

However, Dye (1991) approached audit fees from the perspective of information, and thus argued that the initial audit fee discount is not a transactional cost suggested by DeAngelo (1981), but it is based on the assumption of the bargaining power of the auditor in the process of deciding the audit fee. In other words, he expected that if the company under audit has all of bargaining power in the process of deciding audit fees, no initial audit fee discount will be offered since there are no future rents for the auditor. Therefore, if audit fees are published, the effect of future quasi-rents is decreased, and no more initial audit fee discount will be offered. Subsequently, Craswell and Francis (1999) presented an empirical result based on data in Australia showing that no initial audit fee discount is offered except in the case of escalation change from non-Big8 to Big8.

Studies on non-audit services have focused on the independence issue of the auditor through simultaneous provision of audit and non-audit services. Since the simultaneous provision of audit service and non-audit services might disrupt the independence of the auditor due to the close relationship between the auditor and the company under audit, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) has required the publication of non-audit services from 2001. In relation to this, Dee et al. (2002) suggested that the accrual is increased as the portion of non-audit fees increases. In particular, Frankel et al. (2002) presented a negative association between the portion of non-audit services fee at the publication of audit fees and the stock returns.

However, even the portion of fees for non-audit services has consistently increased. Antle et al. (2006) proposed a negative association between non-audit services fee and abnormal accrual based on the knowledge transfer phenomenon due to the simultaneous provision of non-audit services. Moreover, DeFond et al. (2002) proposed that there is no meaningful relation between the portion of non-audit services fee and the auditor's opinion on the uncertainty for going-concern business, and argued that this is based on the auditor's reputation.

Hypotheses

In consideration of the knowledge transfer phenomenon due to simultaneous provision of audit and non-audit services mostly presented by the previous research related to non-audit services, the simultaneous and repetitive provision of non-audit services is considered possible in a continuous audit. The non-audit services that are provided based on information of the company under audit collected from an audit increases profits. Therefore, the non-audit services are provided more frequently during the continuous audit period than the initial audit year.

However, in consideration of the fact that the initial audit fee discount arises due to the competition between auditors to win an audit contract, a different supposition can be postulated. In the case of a large auditor (BIG), which has a relative cost advantage due to its size (or technical efficiency based on industrial expertise), the initial audit fee discount may be large due to the quasi-rents during the future audit period, whereas the inferior small auditor (non-BIG) presents a limited initial audit fee discount (Ettredge and Greenberg 1990). At this time, the small auditor (non-BIG), which has a limited initial audit fee discount, will establish a strategy to win a new audit contract through other measures rather than the initial audit fee discount. In other words, it will provide the initial audit and additional non-audit services simultaneously, which may induce the possibility to follow a non-pricing strategy rather than a pricing strategy using the initial audit fee discount, which is limited compared to that of the large auditor (BIG). Therefore, the following hypothesis is postulated.

Hypothesis 1: (In a situation where the non-audit services are relatively unusual at the initial audit year) The initial audit where a large auditor (BIG) is changed to a small auditor (non-BIG), non-audit services will probably be offered.

The unreasonable audit fees could be a sign as the possibility of disrupting the auditor’s independence to the information user. If the audit fees are below a certain level, the economic relationship based on quasi-rents for the future audit period can be assumed, and if the audit fees exceed a certain level, then an audit opinion may be purchased. At this time, in consideration of the high quality of audit from a large auditor (BIG), there is no benefit in changing to a small auditor (non-BIG) from a large auditor (BIG) at higher audit fees, so it is likely for a small auditor (non-BIG) to offer lower audit fees (DeAngelo 1981; Becker et al. 1998).

However, the non-pricing strategy to provide non-audit services simultaneously may be a practical alternative since the issue of the auditor’s independence may be raised due to the significantly lower audit fees and discounts are limited due to the poor cost advantage compared to a large auditor (BIG). This strategy may avoid the independence issue by maintaining similar audit fees compared to the large auditor (BIG), while obtaining a discount effect of audit fees by providing non-audit services simultaneously. Therefore, a small auditor provides additional non-audit services similar to the total fees provided by a large auditor (BIG) to compete against the large auditor (BIG) by discounting the fees per service. Therefore, the following hypothesis is postulated.

Hypothesis 2: The initial audit fee discount in terms of non-audit services is probably offered in the case of changing to a small auditor (non-BIG) from a large auditor (BIG).

SELECTION OF SAMPLE AND RESEARCH DESIGN

Selection of Sample

We analyze the listed companies on the KOSPI and KOSDAQ from 2003 to 2014. We collect financial data and corporate governance data from the KISVALUE database and audit fees and non-audit service fees from TS-2000. We select firms with a December 31 fiscal year-end. Lastly, we exclude firms that belong to the financial industry. All variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles. The final sample size is 11,578 observations.

Research Model

We estimate the relation between non-audit services and auditor change using Equation (1). In order to calculate the probability of a client receiving a non-audit service, we use the results of the following logit model:

$$p(NASR_{D_{it}}) = \alpha_0 + \alpha_1 BIG_{NONBIG_{it}} + \alpha_2 NONBIG_BIG_{it} + \alpha_3 BIG_BIG_{it} + \alpha_4 NONBIG_NONBIG_{it} + \alpha_5 LAST_{it} + \alpha_6 SIZE_{it} + \alpha_7 LEV_{it} + \alpha_8 GRW_{it} + \alpha_9 MB_{it} + \alpha_{10} ROA_{it} + \alpha_{11} CFO_{it} + \alpha_{12} OWNER_{it} + \alpha_{13} FORGI_{it} + \alpha_{14} BIG4_{it} + \alpha_{15} KOSPI_{it} + IND + YD + e \tag{1}$$

- NASF_D*: 1 if the client receives non-audit services for auditor and 0 otherwise;
- BIG_{NONBIG}*: 1 if changes a large auditor to a small auditor and 0 otherwise;
- NONBIG_{BIG}*: 1 if changes a small auditor to a large auditor and 0 otherwise;
- BIG_{BIG}*: 1 if changes a large auditor to a large auditor and 0 otherwise;
- NONBIG_{NONBIG}*: 1 if changes a small auditor to a small auditor and 0 otherwise;
- LAST*: 1 if last audit and 0 otherwise;
- SIZE*: The natural logarithm of total assets;
- LEV*: Total liabilities divided by total assets;
- GRW*: Sales divided by beginning sales;
- MB*: Market value divided by book value;
- ROA*: Net income divided by lagged total assets;
- CFO*: Operating cash flow divided by total assets;
- OWNER*: Ownership of largest shareholder and related parties;
- FORGI*: Foreign ownership;
- BIG4*: 1 if auditor is a large auditor called Big 4 and 0 otherwise;
- KOSPI*: 1 if firms are listed in KOSPI and 0 otherwise;

IND: industry dummy
YD: year dummy

Our variables of interest are *BIG_NONBIG*, *NONBIG_BIG*, *BIG_BIG* and *NONBIG_NONBIG*. We expect that the probability of a client receiving a non-audit services are more pronounced for firms changing a large auditor to a small auditor. Therefore, we predict α_1 to be positive or not significant but $\alpha_2, \alpha_3, \alpha_4$ to be negative in support of H1. We include control variables (*LAST*, *SIZE*, *LEV*, *GRW*, *MB*, *ROA*, *CFO*, *OWNER*, *FORGI*, *BIG4*, *KOSPI*) as in Kim et al. (2016).

We estimate the relation the initial audit fee discount in terms of non-audit services and types of auditor change using Equation (2):

$$\ln AF_{it} = \beta_0 + \beta_1 \ln NASFEE_{it} + \beta_2 AUD_{CHI-4}_{it} + \beta_3 \ln NASFEE_{it} * AUD_{CHI}_{it} + \beta_4 LAST_{it} + \beta_5 ROA_{it-1} + \beta_6 LOSS_{it-1} + \beta_7 LEV_{it-1} + \beta_8 SIZE_{it-1} + \beta_9 GRW_{it-1} + \beta_{10} EXPRATIO_{it-1} + \beta_{11} LIQ_{it-1} + \beta_{12} INVAR_{it-1} + \beta_{13} MB_{it-1} + \beta_{14} OWNER_{it} + \beta_{15} FORGI_{it} \tag{2}$$

lnAF: The natural logarithm of audit fee;
lnNASFEE: The natural logarithm of non-audit fee;
AUD_CHI-4;
 (1) *BIG_NONBIG*: 1 if changes a large auditor to a small auditor and 0 otherwise;
 (2) *NONBIG_BIG*: 1 if changes a small auditor to a large auditor and 0 otherwise;
 (3) *BIG_BIG*: 1 if changes a large auditor to a large auditor and 0 otherwise;
 (4) *NONBIG_NONBIG*: 1 if changes a small auditor to a small auditor and 0 otherwise;
LOSS: 1 if a firm reports loss and 0 otherwise;
EXPRATIO: international sales divided by sales;
LIQ: current asset divided current liability
INVAR: Receivables and inventory divided by total assets;
OPINO: 1 if audit opinion is clean and 0 otherwise;

Our variable of interest is $\ln NASFEE_{it} * AUD_{CH}$. Then we perform a regression analysis using Equation (2) across subsamples of firms with audit change type (*AUD_CHI-4*). The variables *AUD_CHI-4* are *BIG_NONBIG*, *NONBIG_BIG*, *BIG_BIG* and *NONBIG_NONBIG*. We only expect a negative coefficient of $\ln NASFEE_{it} * AUD_{CH1}$ (*BIG_NONBIG*) in line with Hypothesis 2. The control variable *LART*, *ROA*, *LOSS*, *LEV* is a proxy for audit risk and *SIZE*, *GRW*, *EXPRATO* are a proxy for client size (Simunic 1980; Francis 1984). We also include liquidity control variables (*LIQ* and *INVAR*) and corporate governance control variables (*OWNER*, *FORGI*). Simunic (1980) and Francis (1984) demonstrated that audit fees are positively associated with auditor’s disqualified opinion, so we include audit opinion. We control for Book value to Market value (*MB*), because Book value to Market value captures various factors to audit fees in growing firms. Lastly, for all specifications of the research model, we include industry and year dummy to control for industry and year effects.

EMPIRICAL RESULTS

Descriptive Statistics and Correlation Analysis

Table 1 provides descriptive statistics for the variables included in Equations (1) and (2) for the full sample. The mean *NASF_D* is 28.95% and the mean of *lnNASFEE* is 4.8669. The mean (median) of *lnAF* is 18.0058 (17.9099). *FIRST* is 15.40 %. The mean of the interesting variables *BIG_NONBIG* is 3.21%.

Table 2, Panel A shows the Pearson correlation among the variables used in Equation (1) and Panel B shows the Pearson correlation among the variables used in Equation (2). The variable *NASF_D* shows a significant negative correlation at 1% significance level with the variable *BIG_NONBIG*. This result reveals a negative relation between non-audit services and changing from a large auditor to a small auditor. The *lnAF* and *NONBIG_BIG* variables show a significant negative correlation, which means that audit fees are negatively associated with firm changes from a large auditor to a small auditor.

Table 1. Descriptive Statistics

Variables	Mean	Std.	Min	1st	Median	3 rd	Max
<i>NASF D</i>	0.2895	0.4536	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	1.0000	1.0000
<i>lnNASFEE</i>	4.8669	7.6628	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	15.4249	19.9054
<i>lnAF</i>	18.0058	0.6417	16.8112	17.5958	17.9099	18.2582	20.2124
<i>FIRST</i>	0.1540	0.3610	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	1.0000
<i>LAST</i>	0.1536	0.3605	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	1.0000
<i>BIG NONBIG</i>	0.0321	0.1764	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	1.0000
<i>NONBIG BIG</i>	0.0279	0.1647	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	1.0000
<i>BIG BIG</i>	0.0478	0.2135	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	1.0000
<i>NONBIG NONBIG</i>	0.0461	0.2098	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	1.0000
<i>SIZE</i>	25.6612	1.3582	23.2805	24.7398	25.3954	26.3203	30.2485
<i>LEV</i>	0.4086	0.1963	0.0404	0.2518	0.4081	0.5553	0.8779
<i>GRW</i>	1.1049	0.3572	0.3342	0.9380	1.0590	1.1968	2.9226
<i>MB</i>	1.3333	1.2299	0.1848	0.5976	0.9500	1.5937	7.7098
<i>ROA</i>	0.0122	0.1140	-0.5681	-0.0007	0.0308	0.0678	0.2128
<i>CFO</i>	0.0496	0.1008	-0.2641	-0.0043	0.0472	0.1034	0.3469
<i>OWNER</i>	0.2693	0.1382	0.0474	0.1655	0.2422	0.3482	0.6999
<i>FOR</i>	0.0633	0.1123	0.0000	0.0014	0.0114	0.0692	0.5613
<i>BIG4</i>	0.5449	0.4980	0.0000	0.0000	1.0000	1.0000	1.0000
<i>KOSPI</i>	0.4222	0.4939	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	1.0000	1.0000
<i>LAG ROA</i>	0.0177	0.1133	-0.5504	0.0030	0.0342	0.0739	0.2235
<i>LAG LOSS</i>	0.2345	0.4237	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	1.0000
<i>LAG SIZE</i>	25.5854	1.3616	23.2381	24.6572	25.3218	26.2473	30.1817
<i>LAG LEV</i>	0.4071	0.1952	0.0433	0.2517	0.4057	0.5520	0.8751
<i>LAG GRW</i>	1.1296	0.4001	0.3405	0.9483	1.0704	1.2147	3.3131
<i>LAG EXPRATIO</i>	0.2699	0.3054	0.0000	0.0001	0.1285	0.5005	0.9865
<i>LAG LIQ</i>	2.5703	2.9318	0.2541	1.0514	1.5931	2.7697	19.2912
<i>LAG INVAR</i>	0.2782	0.1541	0.0000	0.1633	0.2670	0.3811	0.6785
<i>LAG MB</i>	1.3051	1.1964	0.1757	0.5806	0.9343	1.5808	7.4121
<i>LAG OPINO</i>	0.9977	0.0482	0.0000	1.0000	1.0000	1.0000	1.0000

Table 2. Correlation Matrix

Panel A. Correlation Matrix for Model 1

	V1	V2	V3	V4	V5	V6	V7	V8
<i>NASF D(V1)</i>	1.000							
<i>BIG NONBIG (V2)</i>	-0.032	1.000						
<i>NONBIG BIG (V3)</i>	-0.003	-0.031	1.000					
<i>BIG BIG (V4)</i>	0.023	-0.041	-0.038	1.000				
<i>NONBIG NONBIG (V5)</i>	-0.060	-0.040	-0.037	-0.049	1.000			
<i>LAST(V6)</i>	-0.038	-0.078	-0.072	-0.095	-0.094	1.000		
<i>SIZE(V7)</i>	0.192	-0.068	-0.010	0.142	-0.111	-0.038	1.000	
<i>LEV(V8)</i>	-0.007	-0.020	0.006	0.024	-0.002	0.040	0.201	1.000
<i>GRW(V9)</i>	0.005	0.003	0.025	0.003	0.022	-0.009	-0.023	0.045
<i>MB(V10)</i>	0.044	-0.008	0.000	0.006	0.003	0.030	-0.096	0.066
<i>ROA(V11)</i>	0.059	-0.003	0.015	0.032	-0.059	-0.082	0.196	-0.282
<i>CFO(V12)</i>	0.068	-0.017	0.008	0.021	-0.050	-0.035	0.074	-0.184
<i>OWNER(V13)</i>	0.023	-0.015	0.014	0.025	-0.025	-0.020	0.045	-0.021
<i>FOR(V14)</i>	0.168	-0.053	-0.016	0.083	-0.077	-0.028	0.463	-0.103
<i>BIG4(V15)</i>	0.171	-0.199	0.155	0.205	-0.241	-0.024	0.364	0.031
<i>KOSPI(V16)</i>	0.121	-0.056	0.000	0.101	-0.058	0.000	0.552	0.103

(Table 1, Panel A continued on next page)

Panel A. continued

	V9	V10	V11	V12	V13	V14	V15	V16
GRW(V9)	1.000							
MB(V10)	0.102	1.000						
ROA(V11)	0.188	-0.096	1.000					
CFO(V12)	0.089	0.028	0.449	1.000				
OWNER(V13)	-0.010	-0.062	0.131	0.071	1.000			
FOR(V14)	-0.008	0.110	0.181	0.155	0.022	1.000		
BIG4(V15)	-0.021	-0.009	0.092	0.082	0.092	0.243	1.000	
KOSPI(V16)	-0.066	-0.166	0.075	-0.025	0.040	0.263	0.237	1.000

Panel B. Correlation Matrix for Model 2

	V1	V2	V3	V4	V5	V6	V7	V8	V9
lnAF (V1)	1.000								
lnNASFEE (V2)	0.259	1.000							
BIG_NONBIG (V3)	-0.098	-0.036	1.000						
NONBIG_BIG (V4)	-0.028	-0.002	-0.031	1.000					
BIG BIG (V5)	0.116	0.025	-0.041	-0.038	1.000				
NONBIG_NONBIG (V6)	-0.100	-0.063	-0.040	-0.037	-0.049	1.000			
LAG ROA (V7)	0.055	0.055	-0.038	-0.005	0.024	-0.069	1.000		
LAG LOSS (V8)	-0.055	-0.045	0.033	-0.002	-0.019	0.048	-0.706	1.000	
LAG SIZE (V9)	0.815	0.222	-0.072	-0.013	0.136	-0.113	0.173	-0.155	1.000
LAG LEV (V10)	0.239	0.004	-0.014	0.009	0.021	0.001	-0.288	0.221	0.221
LAG GRW (V11)	-0.021	0.008	-0.005	0.000	-0.012	0.003	0.191	-0.156	-0.018
LAG EXPRATIO (V12)	0.070	0.027	-0.003	-0.006	-0.002	-0.020	0.028	0.017	0.075
LAG LIQ (V13)	-0.209	0.007	0.024	-0.011	-0.022	0.017	0.119	-0.072	-0.215
LAG INVAR (V4)	-0.168	-0.079	0.013	0.021	-0.043	0.007	0.091	-0.092	-0.168
LAG MB (V15)	0.071	0.049	0.004	0.011	0.018	0.022	-0.069	0.072	-0.088
OWNER (V16)	-0.004	0.022	-0.015	0.014	0.025	-0.025	0.124	-0.086	0.043
FOR (V17)	0.436	0.189	-0.053	-0.016	0.083	-0.077	0.184	-0.149	0.456
LAG OPINO (V18)	0.000	0.011	0.009	0.008	0.002	0.002	0.027	-0.028	0.013

Panel B. continued

	V10	V11	V12	V13	V14	V15	V16	V17	V18
LAG LEV (V10)	1.000								
LAG GRW (V11)	0.041	1.000							
LAG EXPRATIO (V12)	0.049	0.008	1.000						
LAG LIQ (V13)	-0.619	-0.035	-0.014	1.000					
LAG INVAR (V4)	0.188	0.079	0.029	-0.144	1.000				
LAG MB (V15)	0.062	0.111	0.011	0.042	-0.077	1.000			
OWNER (V16)	-0.020	-0.013	-0.056	0.035	0.016	-0.059	1.000		
FOR (V17)	-0.088	0.009	0.015	0.029	-0.128	0.109	0.022	1.000	
LAG OPINO (V18)	-0.022	0.004	-0.006	0.009	-0.005	-0.006	-0.010	-0.006	1.000

1) The lower triangle presents the Pearson correlation coefficients. Boldfaced figures are statistically significant at the 0.05 level.

Table 2. Correlation Matrix

Panel A. Correlation Matrix for Model 1

	V1	V2	V3	V4	V5	V6	V7	V8
<i>NASF D(V1)</i>	1.000							
<i>BIG NONBIG (V2)</i>	-0.032	1.000						
<i>NONBIG BIG (V3)</i>	-0.003	-0.031	1.000					
<i>BIG BIG (V4)</i>	0.023	-0.041	-0.038	1.000				
<i>NONBIG NONBIG (V5)</i>	-0.060	-0.040	-0.037	-0.049	1.000			
<i>LAST(V6)</i>	-0.038	-0.078	-0.072	-0.095	-0.094	1.000		
<i>SIZE(V7)</i>	0.192	-0.068	-0.010	0.142	-0.111	-0.038	1.000	
<i>LEV(V8)</i>	-0.007	-0.020	0.006	0.024	-0.002	0.040	0.201	1.000
<i>GRW(V9)</i>	0.005	0.003	0.025	0.003	0.022	-0.009	-0.023	0.045
<i>MB(V10)</i>	0.044	-0.008	0.000	0.006	0.003	0.030	-0.096	0.066
<i>ROA(V11)</i>	0.059	-0.003	0.015	0.032	-0.059	-0.082	0.196	-0.282
<i>CFO(V12)</i>	0.068	-0.017	0.008	0.021	-0.050	-0.035	0.074	-0.184
<i>OWNER(V13)</i>	0.023	-0.015	0.014	0.025	-0.025	-0.020	0.045	-0.021
<i>FOR(V14)</i>	0.168	-0.053	-0.016	0.083	-0.077	-0.028	0.463	-0.103
<i>BIG4(V15)</i>	0.171	-0.199	0.155	0.205	-0.241	-0.024	0.364	0.031
<i>KOSPI(V16)</i>	0.121	-0.056	0.000	0.101	-0.058	0.000	0.552	0.103

Panel A. continued

	V9	V10	V11	V12	V13	V14	V15	V16
<i>GRW(V9)</i>	1.000							
<i>MB(V10)</i>	0.102	1.000						
<i>ROA(V11)</i>	0.188	-0.096	1.000					
<i>CFO(V12)</i>	0.089	0.028	0.449	1.000				
<i>OWNER(V13)</i>	-0.010	-0.062	0.131	0.071	1.000			
<i>FOR(V14)</i>	-0.008	0.110	0.181	0.155	0.022	1.000		
<i>BIG4(V15)</i>	-0.021	-0.009	0.092	0.082	0.092	0.243	1.000	
<i>KOSPI(V16)</i>	-0.066	-0.166	0.075	-0.025	0.040	0.263	0.237	1.000

Panel B. Correlation Matrix for Model 2

	V1	V2	V3	V4	V5	V6	V7	V8	V9
<i>lnAF (V1)</i>	1.000								
<i>lnNASFEE (V2)</i>	0.259	1.000							
<i>BIG NONBIG (V3)</i>	-0.098	-0.036	1.000						
<i>NONBIG BIG (V4)</i>	-0.028	-0.002	-0.031	1.000					
<i>BIG BIG (V5)</i>	0.116	0.025	-0.041	-0.038	1.000				
<i>NONBIG NONBIG (V6)</i>	-0.100	-0.063	-0.040	-0.037	-0.049	1.000			
<i>LAG ROA (V7)</i>	0.055	0.055	-0.038	-0.005	0.024	-0.069	1.000		
<i>LAG LOSS (V8)</i>	-0.055	-0.045	0.033	-0.002	-0.019	0.048	-0.706	1.000	
<i>LAG SIZE (V9)</i>	0.815	0.222	-0.072	-0.013	0.136	-0.113	0.173	-0.155	1.000
<i>LAG LEV (V10)</i>	0.239	0.004	-0.014	0.009	0.021	0.001	-0.288	0.221	0.221
<i>LAG GRW (V11)</i>	-0.021	0.008	-0.005	0.000	-0.012	0.003	0.191	-0.156	-0.018
<i>LAG EXPRATIO (V12)</i>	0.070	0.027	-0.003	-0.006	-0.002	-0.020	0.028	0.017	0.075
<i>LAG LIQ (V13)</i>	-0.209	0.007	0.024	-0.011	-0.022	0.017	0.119	-0.072	-0.215
<i>LAG INVAR (V4)</i>	-0.168	-0.079	0.013	0.021	-0.043	0.007	0.091	-0.092	-0.168
<i>LAG MB (V15)</i>	0.071	0.049	0.004	0.011	0.018	0.022	-0.069	0.072	-0.088
<i>OWNER (V16)</i>	-0.004	0.022	-0.015	0.014	0.025	-0.025	0.124	-0.086	0.043
<i>FOR (V17)</i>	0.436	0.189	-0.053	-0.016	0.083	-0.077	0.184	-0.149	0.456
<i>LAG OPINO (V18)</i>	0.000	0.011	0.009	0.008	0.002	0.002	0.027	-0.028	0.013

(Table 2, Panel B continued on next page)

Panel B. Continued

	V10	V11	V12	V13	V14	V15	V16	V17	V18
LAG_LEV (V10)	1.000								
LAG_GRW (V11)	0.041	1.000							
LAG_EXPRATIO (V12)	0.049	0.008	1.000						
LAG_LIQ (V13)	-0.619	-0.035	-0.014	1.000					
LAG_INVAR (V4)	0.188	0.079	0.029	-0.144	1.000				
LAG_MB (V15)	0.062	0.111	0.011	0.042	-0.077	1.000			
OWNER (V16)	-0.020	-0.013	-0.056	0.035	0.016	-0.059	1.000		
FOR (V17)	-0.088	0.009	0.015	0.029	-0.128	0.109	0.022	1.000	
LAG_OPINO (V18)	-0.022	0.004	-0.006	0.009	-0.005	-0.006	-0.010	-0.006	1.000

Results for the Study Hypotheses

Table 3 provides the results of Equation (1) to test hypothesis 1. The non-audit services and initial audit have a significant negative association. However, the results reveal no significant relationship between non-audit services and the change from a large auditor to a small auditor. The result suggests that in the case of an initial audit where a large auditor is changed to a small auditor, non-audit services will likely be provided.

Table 3. Results of Hypothesis 1

	Coefficient	p-value	Coefficient	p-value
Intercept	-6.6320***	(<.0001)	-6.6560***	(<.0001)
FIRST	-0.2592***	(<.0001)		
BIG_NONBIG			-0.0834	(0.5398)
NONBIG_BIG			-0.3043**	(0.0221)
BIG_BIG			-0.3184***	(0.0015)
NONBIG_NONBIG			-0.2624**	(0.0362)
LAST	-0.2889***	(<.0001)	-0.2895***	(<.0001)
SIZE	0.2120***	(<.0001)	0.2122***	(<.0001)
LEV	-0.4402***	(0.0005)	-0.4380***	(0.0006)
GRW	-0.0006	(0.9926)	0.0001	(0.9993)
MV	0.1030***	(<.0001)	0.1034***	(<.0001)
ROA	-0.2735	(0.2523)	-0.2770	(0.2465)
CFO	0.7791***	(0.0015)	0.7818***	(0.0014)
OWNER	0.2303	(0.1390)	0.2304	(0.1389)
FORGI	0.7320***	(0.0007)	0.7322***	(0.0007)
BIG4	0.4997***	(<.0001)	0.5184***	(<.0001)
KOSPI	0.1834***	(0.0009)	0.1843***	(0.0009)
IND		Included		Included
YD		Included		Included
Max-rescaled R2		0.1170		0.1173
Likelihood Ration		989.2028***		991.32777***
# of NASF=1		3,352		3,352
# of NASF=0		8,226		8,226
Obs.		11,578		11,578

1) Variable definition FIRST: 1 if audit is initial audit and otherwise 0. Notes: *, **, *** represent significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels, respectively.

Table 4 reports the results of Equation (2) to test hypothesis 2. Consistent with hypothesis 2, we find that the coefficients on AUD_CH*lnNASFEE are significantly negative for the third column, which shows Equation (2) by using AUD_CH as a proxy for BIG_NONBIG (-0.1571, t=-3.56). However, we find no significant relationship between lnAF and AUD_CH2*lnNASFEE, AUD_CH3*lnNASFEE and AUD_CH4*lnNASFEE. The result suggest that the initial audit fee discount in terms of non-audit services is probably offered in the case of changing to a small auditor from a large auditor. We continue to find evidence generally supporting our hypothesis 2.

Table 4. Results of Hypothesis 2

	Proxy for AUD_CH				
	FIRST	BIG_NONBIG	NONBIG_BIG	BIG_BIG	NONBIG_NONBIG
	Coefficient (t-stat.)	Coefficient (t-stat.)	Coefficient (t-stat.)	Coefficient (t-stat.)	Coefficient (t-stat.)
Intercept	8.6303*** (82.68)	8.6618*** (83.06)	8.6282*** (82.52)	8.6318*** (82.31)	8.6459*** (82.53)
lnNASFEE	0.0061*** (12.98)	0.0059*** (13.55)	0.0059*** (13.31)	0.0059*** (13.15)	0.0059*** (13.26)
AUD_CH	-0.0467*** (-4.38)	-0.1159*** (-5.67)	-0.0412* (-1.78)	0.0109 (0.58)	-0.0213 (-1.26)
AUD_CH* lnNASFEE	-0.0026** (-2.14)	-0.1571*** (-3.56)	-0.0501 (-1.16)	-0.0276 (-0.87)	-0.0551 (-1.36)
LAST	0.0070 (0.75)	-0.2929*** (-6.97)	-0.2893*** (-6.86)	-0.2882*** (-6.83)	-0.2898*** (-6.87)
LAG_ROA	-0.2945*** (-6.99)	0.0204* (1.90)	0.0201* (1.87)	0.0201* (1.87)	0.0200* (1.86)
LAG_LOSS	0.0200* (1.86)	0.3665*** (116.17)	0.3676*** (116.26)	0.3675*** (115.56)	0.3670*** (115.73)
LAG_LEV	0.14805*** (6.24)	-0.0175** (-2.09)	-0.0170** (-2.04)	-0.01684** (-2.01)	-0.0168** (-2.01)
LAG_SIZE	0.3677*** (116.47)	0.1471*** (6.21)	0.1468*** (6.18)	0.1481*** (6.23)	0.1487*** (6.26)
LAG_GRW	-0.01782** (-2.13)	0.0081 (0.68)	0.00849 (0.71)	0.00847 (0.71)	0.0080 (0.68)
LAG_EXPRATIO	0.00742 (0.62)	-0.0054*** (-3.84)	-0.0055*** (-3.95)	-0.00553*** (-3.91)	-0.0054*** (-3.87)
LAG_LIQ	-0.00546*** (-3.86)	0.0077 (0.33)	0.0065 (0.28)	0.00559 (0.23)	0.0049 (0.21)
LAG_INVAR	0.00519 (0.22)	0.0549*** (18.66)	0.0552*** (18.69)	0.05502*** (18.62)	0.0549*** (18.59)
LAG_MB	0.05537*** (18.77)	-0.1041*** (-4.44)	-0.0999*** (-4.25)	-0.10108*** (-4.3)	-0.1022*** (-4.35)
OWNER	-0.0993*** (-4.23)	0.3961*** (11.61)	0.3995*** (11.67)	0.40225*** (11.75)	0.4009*** (11.72)
FORGI	0.39731*** (11.63)	-0.08344 (-1.26)	-0.08724 (-1.32)	-0.08792 (-1.33)	-0.08762 (-1.32)
LAG_OPINO	-0.08546 (-1.29)	-0.0933*** (-5.74)	-0.0862*** (-5.29)	-0.08714*** (-5.35)	-0.0879*** (-5.4)
IND	Included	Included	Included	Included	Included
YD	Included	Included	Included	Included	Included
Adj. R ²	0.7156	0.7164	0.7146	0.7144	0.7146
Obs.	11578	11578	11578	11578	11578

1) Notes: *, **, *** represent significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels, respectively.

Additional Tests

In this section, we conduct sensitivity tests to verify whether the above results are robust using the extended model. We present a regression analysis that incorporates the four audit change variables, BIG_NONBIG, NONBIG_BIG, BIG_BIG, and NONBIG_NONBIG, and the four interaction variables, lnNASFEE* BIG_NONBIG, lnNASFEE* NONBIG_BIG, lnNASFEE* BIG_BIG, and lnNASFEE* NONBIG_NONBIG.

The results are consistent with our hypotheses, and we find that the coefficients on lnNASFEE* BIG_NONBIG are significantly negative for the extended model. The results reveal no significant relationship between audit fees (lnAF) and lnNASFEE* NONBIG_BIG, lnNASFEE* BIG_BIG, and lnNASFEE* NONBIG_NONBIG. However, audit fees have the significantly negative association with non-audit fees when changing from a large auditor to a small auditor.

Table 5. Results of Hypothesis 2 by Using the Extended Model

	Coefficient	(t-stat.)
<i>Intercept</i>	8.6748***	(82.87)
<i>lnNASFEE</i>	0.0062***	(13.35)
<i>BIG NONBIG</i>	-0.1206***	(-5.88)
<i>NONBIG BIG</i>	-0.0497**	(-2.15)
<i>BIG BIG</i>	0.0032	(0.17)
<i>NONBIG NONBIG</i>	-0.0312*	(-1.84)
<i>lnNASFEE* BIG NONBIG</i>	-0.1608***	(-3.64)
<i>lnNASFEE* NONBIG BIG</i>	-0.0542	(-1.26)
<i>lnNASFEE* BIG BIG</i>	-0.0326	(-1.03)
<i>lnNASFEE* NONBIG NONBIG</i>	-0.0592	(-1.47)
<i>LAG ROA</i>	-0.2977***	(-7.08)
<i>LAG LOSS</i>	0.0201*	(1.87)
<i>LAG LEV</i>	0.1474***	(6.22)
<i>LAG LEV</i>	0.3660***	(115.18)
<i>LAG GRW</i>	-0.0180**	(-2.16)
<i>LAG EXPRATIO</i>	0.0073	(0.61)
<i>LAG LIQ</i>	-0.0054***	(-3.82)
<i>LAG INVAR</i>	0.0075	(0.32)
<i>LAG MB</i>	0.0552***	(18.73)
<i>OWNER</i>	-0.1027***	(-4.38)
<i>FORGI</i>	0.3902***	(11.44)
<i>LAG OPINO</i>	-0.0814	(-1.23)
IND		Included
YD		Included
Adj. R ²		0.7168
Obs.		11578

1) Notes: *, **, *** represent significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels, respectively.

2) See TABLE 1 for definition for other variables.

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

The purpose of this research is to verify whether non-audit services are provided without additional fees at the initial audit as a strategy to win an external audit contract, which could give the appearance of initial audit fee discount. The results are as follows.

Similar to Beck et al. (1988a), it is reconfirmed that non-audit services are generally not provided simultaneously in the case of an initial audit. However, if the type of auditor change is classified, and if it is changed from a Big 4 accounting firm to a non-Big 4 accounting firm, it tends to provide non-audit services at initial audit unlike other change types. This result suggests that a non-Big 4 accounting firm may use non-audit services in order to win external audit contracts. In order to verify this, entire samples are divided into four groups according to the types of auditor change and verified. As a result, non-audit services are provided at the initial audit, and the initial audit fee is appeared to be discounted accordingly, only when the independent auditor is changed from a Big 4 accounting firm to a non-Big 4 accounting firm. However, there is no meaningful relevance in any other types of changes. Therefore, if the auditor is changed from a Big 4 accounting firm to a non-Big 4 accounting firm, non-audit services are provided without additional fees in order to win an external audit contract, and the publication of audit fees with a division between the audit service fee and the non-audit service fee may give the appearance of a discounted audit service fee.

This research has scientific value in being the first investigation of the relevance between the initial audit fee discount and non-audit services according to the auditor change. Moreover, this research raises the issue regarding the actual nature of the non-audit services provided at initial audit. Since it should provide an audit service and non-audit service within the total fees similar to the audit service fee of the predecessor, the audit hours will be definitely decreased and, therefore, the quality of the audit will likely be degraded. Therefore, the accounting regulation agency needs to pay more attention to the type of auditor change and non-audit services which would be provided at the initial audit. And

the description and nature of the non-audit services provided at the initial audit should be published to protect investors, and the adequacy of the total fees and audit and non-audit service fees needs to be reviewed more carefully.

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