Rational Escalation: The Real Option Perspective

Abstract

Escalation is generally defined in investment context as continuation of an investment project after receiving negative signals about the outcome. This study demonstrates that under conditions of uncertainty about project outcome there is a rational incentive for the manager to continue a project to receive more information. Taking this real option on continuing the project has value for the firm. Simulations results from the option value model of investment demonstrate that likelihood of escalation is higher when signals have higher quality which increases the value of getting an additional signal. Likelihood of escalation also increases when the prior expectation of success is low, and when project termination cost is low. Continuing the project to receive additional information is shown to be more profitable than the simple net present value rule that excludes option value. The model implies that escalation may be value-maximizing for the firm, and managers should not automatically be discouraged to continue a project when new signals about its success may appear in the future.