Openness, Bureaucratic Corruption And Public Policy In An Endogenous Growth Model

Main Article Content

Rangan Gupta
Emmanuel Ziramba

Keywords

Bureaucratic Corruption, Macroeconomic Policy, Openness

Abstract

In this paper, we develop a dynamic general equilibrium overlapping generations monetary endogenous growth model of a financially repressed small open economy characterized by bureaucratic corruption, and, in turn, analyze optimal policy decisions of the government following an increase in the degree of corruption. As suggested in the empirical literature, we find that increases in the degree of corruption should ideally result in an increase in the ratio of seigniorage to total revenue, as an optimal response of the benevolent government. In addition, higher degrees of corruption are also found to be accompanied by higher levels of financial repression.

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