New Evidence On The Structuring Of CEO Incentive Pay Ratios

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Rajaram Veliyath
Kennesaw State University

James Cordeiro
SUNY at Brockport

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Abstract

The model examines both determinants of CEO incentive pay ratios that are controllable by the CEO, and those that are less controllable, based on a sample of 316 Fortune 500 firms in 1992. Firm diversity, firm growth opportunities, outside blockholdings, and the number of analysts following the firm were positively related to CEO incentive compensation ratios, while firm unsystematic risk, CEO stockholdings, and industry regulation had a negative impact. Finally, industry-specific influences were evident on incentive compensation ratios.

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Published
Jan 1, 2001
DOI https://doi.org/10.19030/jabr.v17i1.2068

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How to Cite
Veliyath, R., & Cordeiro, J. (2001). New Evidence On The Structuring Of CEO Incentive Pay Ratios. Journal of Applied Business Research (JABR), 17(1). https://doi.org/10.19030/jabr.v17i1.2068
Issue
Vol. 17 No. 1 (2001)
Section
Articles