Signalling, Insider Trading, And Post-Offering Performance: The Case Of Initial Public Offerings

Abstract

Previous IPO studies have concluded that, on average, (1) the shares of firms going public are underpriced at the time of the offering, (2) prices adjust rapidly in the aftermarket, and (3) IPOs are generally poor performers over the longer-term. This study reevaluates the IPO pricing phenomenon utilizing more recent data and empirically tests the signaling models of Leland and Pyle (1977) and Gale and Stiglitz (1989), which imply that both first-day and aftermarket returns may be related to insiders transactions. Our results suggest that initial returns are inversely related to the proportion of the offering representing insiders share and that corporate insiders are, on average, net sellers in the year subsequent to the initial public offering. We also find that the greatest volume of post-offering insider sales occurs in those firms in which insiders are sold shares at the offering.