Earnings Management Of Mergers And Acquisitions Of Target Candidates And Deal Withdrawn

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Joo-hyun Lim
Jin-ho Chang


M&A, Target, Financial Reporting Quality, Deal Withdrawal


In this paper, we investigate the tendencies of target candidate companies to manage earnings, which affects financial reporting quality, in order to increase transaction value, and the withdrawal of deals as a result of low financial reporting quality in M&A in a sample of 316 mergers and acquisitions in South Korea between 2002 and 2011. Using the accruals quality measure developed by Dechow and Dichev (2002) as a proxy for financial reporting quality, we find the following. First, the financial reporting quality of target candidate firms is lower than that of non-target candidate firms because target candidate firms engage in earnings management prior to M&A. Second, low-quality financial reporting of target firms is positively related to the likelihood of deal withdrawal as a result of poor financial reporting quality.


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