Market Feedback And Managers’ Decisions In Private Placement – Evidence From Chinese Family Firms

Main Article Content

Wanli Li
Weiwei Gao
Wei Sun

Keywords

Family Firm, Private Placement, Agency Theory, Corporate Governance

Abstract

What effect does market feedback have on managers’ decisions on private placement in family firms? Based on information asymmetry, agency theory, and corporate governance theory, we investigate the relationship between managers’ final decisions and market feedback to the announcement. We find that managers in family firms accept market feedback in decision-making and their attitude can be affected by many external factors. Managers tend to listen to the market when family firms are non-high-tech, when family members participate in purchasing the placed shares, when family members serve as managers, and when separation of control rights from ownership is small.

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