Attitudes Of Chinese Listed Enterprises Toward Cash Flow Manipulation: A Resource Dependence Perspective

Abstract

The prevalence of cash flow manipulation has drawn much scholarly attention in China and worldwide, especially since the exposure of the accounting scandals at Enron, WorldCom, and Qwest. Cash flow status also provides a sound basis for corporate valuation. Using a sample of 12,251 firm-year observations from 1999 to 2009, this study thus investigates the attitudes and behavioral patterns of state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and non-SOEs in China toward cash flow manipulation. From a point of departure of resource-dependence theory, we find that non-SOEs tend to manipulate cash flow upward, whereas SOEs are more prone to manipulate cash flow downward. We also demonstrate that non-SOEs are more inclined to manipulate their cash flow statements compared with SOEs. The reason behind this differing behavior could be that non-SOEs are reliant on cash and funds from entities, such as governments and banks, and thus, they falsely enhance cash flow and firm performance in order to signal their solvency and thereby reduce financing costs. By contrast, since SOEs always receive sufficient cash inflows from both government sources and state-owned banks, the managers of these firms are unconcerned about cash flow shortages, which lessens their motivation to manipulate the figures. Indeed, this study finds that these managers may even reduce reported cash flow intentionally in order to obtain government assistance. Therefore, investors and regulators should make their judgments on the cash flow of entities based on their status as SOEs or non-SOEs.