The Role Of Board Characteristics In Mitigating Management Opportunism: The Case Of Real Earnings Management
Main Article Content
Keywords
Real Earnings Management, Board Of Directors, Audit Committee, Managerial Myopia, Corporate Governance
Abstract
This study seeks to provide empirical evidence of the efficacy of board characteristics in constraining management opportunism, measured by real earnings management. The paper uses regression analysis to document empirical evidence regarding the impact of the independence of boards of directors and the independence of committees on real earnings management in 7,481 US firms over the period 2000 to 2009. This study contributes to empirical studies on the role of corporate governance in financial reporting quality by demonstrating the role of the independence of boards of directors and the independence of committees in constraining real earnings management. These results should contribute to providing an orientation for future regulators regarding possible amendments, especially in the wake of the current financial crisis.